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Abstract 
Increasingly, law enforcement agencies have been forced to become more creative in their 
problem solving efforts, that is, do more with less. Arresting their way out of a problem is not 
always the best response on many levels given the cost to taxpayers as well as the possible strain 
put on community relationships. Given the other realization that some problems are not solely 
police problems, solving problems using multi-agency partnerships has gained traction and there 
is evidence to support these partnerships as viable options. This manuscript presents a pilot study 
of a problem-solving effort in Indianapolis, Indiana grounded in multi-agency partnerships. Led 
by the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, the goal was to reduce the burden of 
mentally ill and/or addicted homeless individuals on the criminal justice and emergency medical 
services systems. It serves to inform both academics and practitioners about an innovative 
strategy occurring in Indianapolis which may help relieve some of the economic burden on the 
criminal justice system and ultimately decrease the homeless population.  
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Introduction 
While not a crime in itself, homelessness is increasingly becoming a public safety issue 
as business owners, tourists, commuters, and neighborhood residents look to law enforcement to 
manage the homeless population. And, as Buffington-Vollum (2012) suggests, the relationship of 
homelessness to mental illness simply cannot be ignored (see, for example, Drake et al. 1991; 
Fischer and Breakey 1991; Levine and Huebner 1991). However, responding to calls for service 
involving homeless individuals is not commonly included in police academy training. In some 
instances, the solution has been to criminalize homelessness, and many jurisdictions are enacting 
local ordinances that restrict the movements of the homeless, which results in more frequent 
arrest and incarceration (see, for example, Fang 2009; Greenberg and Rosenheck 2008; Kushel et 
al. 2005; McNiel et al. 2005). Given that some criminal justice issues are not just police matters, 
multi-agency partnerships have gained traction as a means of addressing these issues (Council of 
State Governments 2002; Lamb et al. 2002; Normore et al. 2015). Normore et al (2015) suggest 
that these partnerships are critical options and recommends that police organizations partner with 
mental health agencies in an effort to create a better response to homeless individuals with 
mental health issues.   
How might police partnerships address the issue of better serving homeless and mentally 
ill populations? Using retrospective data from Indianapolis, Indiana, this case study (Creswell 
2012) explores how the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) Homelessness and 
Panhandling Unit (HPU) created a climate of partnerships to address mental illness, addiction, 
crime and victimization, emergency and transitional housing,  and other social services for the 
homeless population in the city The police sought, when possible, non-arrest alternatives to 
working with homeless individuals suffering from mental illness. This study’s aim is to identify 
for both academics and practitioners a non-arrest based innovative strategy in practice in 
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Indianapolis that serves as a model for both relieving some of the economic burden on the 
criminal justice system caused by policing homelessness and, ultimately, decreasing the chronic 
homeless population. This project is atypical in that it originated as a criminal justice program 
from within the police department, and not as part of a grant-funded intervention. As such, the 
project lacks some of the markers of a research project such as detailed data collection as it 
relates to contact with the homeless and mentally ill as well as rigorous process and outcome 
evaluations. This oversight is not uncommon in criminal justice program implementation. And, 
despite this omission, what information and data are available present feasible options to 
jurisdictions facing similar issues with a homeless, mentally ill population (Nagin and Weisburd 
2013). 
Literature Review 
Policing, Mental Illness, and Homelessness 
The 1960s and 1970s, the deinstitutionalization movement in the United States intended 
for the mentally ill to receive better services and care outside of mental institutions. 
Deinstitutionalization proponents anticipated that family and community support would be a 
vital component of the deinstitutionalization process, and would improve the quality of life for 
former inpatients. Unfortunately, for most, these support systems never materialized. And given 
this reality, many of the former inpatients became homeless (Lamb and Weinberger 1998; 
Mechanic and Rochefort 1990), sought self-medication with drugs and/or alcohol (Caton et al. 
2005; Kertesz et al. 2005; Padgett et al. 2006), and often times, became involved in the criminal 
justice system (Buffington-Vollum 2012) and/or ended up incarcerated (Bachrach 1996; Lamb 
and Weinberger 2005; Steadman et al. 2009). In fact, deinstitutionalization, alongside the push 
for increased incarceration in the 1990s, has rendered the criminal justice system as the de facto 
mental health system for many individuals (Johnson 2011). The proportion of individuals 
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incarcerated with a serious mental illness is higher than that of the general population (Lamb and 
Weinberger 1998; Steadman and Cocozza 1993). Indeed, the number of psychiatric inpatients 
has decreased 95% from 1955 to 2000 (Lamb and Weinberger 2005). Given that there is only so 
much money to go around, allocating funds for imprisonment creates gaps in funding in other 
areas like mental health services, among others (Johnson 2011). 
By the nature of their occupation, police officers routinely come face to face with 
individuals who have mental health issues (see for example, Bittner 1967; Teplin and Pruett 
1992). In 1967, Bittner described the discretion police officers had when responding to civil 
matters involving individuals with mental illness; in the intervening years, police officers’ 
dispositional options have decreased due to further restrictions placed on criteria and procedures 
for commitment (Teplin 1983, 1984). Additionally, several United States Supreme Court case 
decisions in the 1970s and early 1980s confirmed the right of mentally ill individuals to live 
without treatment (Teplin 1984). Protecting both the public and those who cannot protect 
themselves (i.e., parens patriae1) such as the mentally ill, has magnified the role of the police 
officer as a gatekeeper to the criminal justice system as well as the mental health system (Lamb 
et al. 2002).  
Homeless individuals who are also mentally ill create unique challenges for each part of 
the criminal justice system. While concrete figures are hard to come by due to the nature of the 
population, generally accepted estimates are that one-third of the homeless population has some 
sort of mental illness. Others estimate 25 percent have a serious mental illness (SMI) (Caton et 
al., 2005; Kertesz et al., 2005; Padgett, Gulcur, & Tsemberis, 2006). The arrest of a mentally ill 
                                                 
1 The state as the parent. Parens patriae is a doctrine that grants the inherent power and authority to the state to 
protect person who are legally unable to act on their own behalf such as children, mentally ill individuals, and others 
who are legally incompetent to manage their own affairs because they are incapacitated or disabled. 
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homeless individual sets off a chain of events that may take years and considerable resources to 
conclude. The current criminal justice system is not user-friendly for someone who, in addition 
to being mentally ill and homeless, most likely does not have a support system in place to bring 
prescription medications to the jail, a job to pay court costs and fees resulting from the arrest and 
jail stay, a clock, alarm, or calendar to alert them to upcoming appointments or court dates, and 
reliable transportation to get to those appointments or required court appearances, just to name a 
few challenges faced by homeless individuals who are mentally ill. The cycle therefore becomes 
arrest, release, failure to appear in court, warrant issued for arrest, and then repeat. Getting 
needed services as well as escaping the cycle is difficult. In the current public safety atmosphere 
of ‘do more with less,’ police must recognize that forming multi-agency partnerships may both 
improve response to mentally ill homeless individuals and save time, resources, and lives.    
In an effort to combat the unintended consequence of the ‘criminalization of the mentally 
ill’ (Abramson 1972) since deinstitutionalization, many police departments have engaged in pre-
arrest diversion programs (see, for example, Cordner 2006; Finn and Sullivan 1989; Perez et al. 
2003). One of the most well-known programs across the United States is the Crisis Intervention 
Team (CIT) used by law enforcement officers. CIT training is delivered by the National Alliance 
on Mental Illness (NAMI). The program builds ‘on strong partnerships between law 
enforcement, mental health provider agencies and individuals and families affected by mental 
illness’ and seeks to improve law enforcement and community  responses to individuals 
experiencing mental health crises (National Alliance on Mental Illness 2015). CIT trains officers 
on how to recognize different mental illness conditions and how to best approach mentally ill 
individuals during the course of a call for service, that is, how to work with the individual and his 
or her family for support.   
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Research surrounding the police and mentally ill tends to focus on these pre-arrest crisis 
situations and possible alternatives to arrest. For example, research conducted in three 
jurisdictions (Birmingham, AL, Knoxville and Memphis, TN) examined three different police 
responses to calls for service involving mentally ill individuals in crises (i.e., emotionally 
disturbed). The police arrested the individual only seven percent of the time. Other options 
included resolving the incident at the scene (most frequent response in Birmingham), or by 
referral to a mental health professional (most common in Knoxville) (Steadman et al. 2000).  
And, while Teller et al. (2006) saw no change in the arrest rates of mentally ill persons after CIT 
program implementation in Akron, Ohio, they did find higher rates of mental health transports 
and referrals, including voluntary, to emergency treatment facilities. This shift in tactics 
demonstrates a non-criminal justice response to increased calls for service. In the face of 
growing numbers of calls for service that involved mentally ill citizens, maintaining the number 
of arrests actually reflects a percentage reduction in arrests overall. 
And, while policing organizations differ across the world, there is consensus that the 
police response to the mentally ill must be enhanced. Canada and Australia have adopted similar 
models to the American CIT model which include increased mental health training for the police 
as well as increased cross-system collaborations to ensure a non-arrest based response to 
mentally ill individuals when appropriate (Wood and Beierschmitt 2014). Similarly, in the 
United States and abroad, there is acknowledgment about the lack of, as well as calls for, earlier 
or ‘upstream’ pre-arrest responses to the mentally ill  (Cordner 2006; Sainsbury Center for 
Mental Health 2009; Victoria Police 2007; Wood and Beierschmitt 2014).  
Criminal justice is no longer the linear process as is it commonly portrayed of case 
processing starting with the police, then the courts, and then corrections. The realization that the 
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police cannot always solve problems alone has emerged over a span of many years. The need for, 
and apparent success, of multi-agency responses to crime problems cannot be ignored (Klofas et 
al. 2010). This along with the evidenced based success of focused, data-driven diagnosis and 
response is creating opportunities for police departments and their partners to embark in creative 
problem solving.  
Models of Police Problem-Solving and Partnerships 
 
 In the last three decades, the police have formed increasing numbers of partnerships with 
various agencies in an effort to address assorted criminal justice issues. This is true in American 
policing as well as internationally. These problem solving collaborations acknowledge the power 
of a multi-agency response and expanded skill set as well as the advantages of pooling resources. 
So much so that in the United Kingdom, the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 legislated that the 
police and local authorities use partnerships as part of a police reform agenda (Fleming 2006; 
Newburn 2008). However, the United Kingdom is not the norm as most police partnerships are 
not legislatively supported. 
 In the United States, there are several well-known examples of successful multi-agency 
initiatives from the late 1990s and 2000s aimed at combating various forms of violent crime. 
These partnerships, while not grounded in any legislation like the United Kingdom’s Crime and 
Disorder Act, were funded through federal grant funds. Boston’s Operation Ceasefire (Braga et 
al. 2001; Piehl et al. 2000) observed a 60% reduction in youth homicides when they employed a 
working group comprised of law enforcement and social service agencies to as part of the 
problem solving efforts. The Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI) was 
a federally funded program in ten sites where the U.S. Attorney convened multi-agency working 
groups who developed specific interventions tailored to a local crime problem. A national 
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evaluation of the project comparing crimes trends in the ten SACSI sites to comparable cities 
found associated declines in targeted crimes such as homicides and violent crime in the SACSI 
sites (Roehl et al. 2008). 
 The SACSI project laid the groundwork for Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a 
national gun violence reduction program, in which one of the five core components is increased 
partnerships between federal, state, and local agencies. Here, a national evaluation comparing 
PSN targets cities to non-PSN target cities found that in sites where PSN was implemented to 
include multi-agency partnerships (as the program intended), PSN target cities experienced a 4.1 
percent decline in violent crime compared to a 0.9 percent decline in non-target cities (McGarrell 
et al. 2010). Problem solving initiatives grounded in multi-agency partnerships continue to be 
favorable evidenced based practices among law enforcement agencies.      
The problem solving partnership initiatives reviewed thus far were, for the most part, 
aimed at reducing violent crime. However, mentally ill individuals do not tend to make their way 
into the criminal justice system for committing acts of violent crime - four of the five most 
common offenses for which mentally ill individuals are charged are non-violent (Torrey et al. 
1998). A recent Campbell systematic review examined the effectiveness of problem-oriented 
policing using the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment) Model (Eck and 
Spelman 1987) in reducing crime and disorder more broadly. The authors reviewed both less 
rigorous pre/post studies and ten more rigorous studies that met their methodological inclusion 
criteria. Results indicated a modest yet significant effect on crime and disorder for the ten studies 
and even more positive results for the less rigorous studies (Weisburd et al. 2010).  
Homelessness in Indianapolis, Indiana 
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‘Point in time’ homeless counts estimate that there are between 200 and 250 homeless 
individuals - specifically those individuals living on the streets or under bridges, not in 
emergency shelters2 - in Indianapolis on any given day and many of these individuals self-report 
mental illness or addiction issues (Majors et al. 2014). Unlike CIT officer interactions discussed 
previously which most often occur during calls for service, the police are not always responding 
to or interacting with homeless individuals who are in a mental health crisis at that moment. That 
is, these police interactions do not always involve calls for service from the public or concerned 
family members. Indeed, the typical law enforcement response to calls for service regarding 
homeless individuals in Indianapolis was arrest, seizure of any property, and posting of ‘no 
trespassing’ signs.   
In 2008, the American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana filed a class-action lawsuit on 
behalf of individuals experiencing homelessness in Indianapolis claiming the City of 
Indianapolis encouraged policy and practice that violated the plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments rights, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 3 The lawsuit 
alleged that IMPD routinely forbade lawful solicitation by homeless individuals (e.g., ‘cup 
shaking’ or sign holding) (First Amendment violation), seized (i.e. detained) homeless 
individuals without cause or suspicion until they could produce identification (Fourth 
Amendment violation), and seized and destroyed property of homeless individuals without 
                                                 
2 While there are many definitions of homelessness, law enforcement primarily encounter homeless individuals who 
meet the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) criteria of having a primary nighttime 
residence or place he or she resides that is not meant for human habitation, such as a car, park, sidewalk, abandoned 
building, bus station, airport etc., that is, he or she is an ‘unsheltered’ homeless individual. A ‘sheltered’ homeless 
individual is someone who resides in an emergency shelter or transitional housing for persons who originally came 
from the streets or emergency shelters [found in the Homeless Emergency Assistance and Rapid Transition to 
Housing Act of 2009 (P.L. 111-22, Section 1003)]. And within this definition there are the short-term homeless, the 
long-term homeless, and the chronically homeless. 
3 United States District Court, Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division Case No. 1:08-cv-780, filed July 
2, 2008. 
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cause, notice, or an opportunity to be heard (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments violations). At 
the time, IMPD did not have a specialized unit or specific officers who were trained to respond 
to calls for service regarding homeless individuals and, undeniably, these actions by officers 
were not atypical. In response to the lawsuit, IMPD created a written policy guiding police 
officer interactions with homeless individuals.4 The formalization of a policy for interactions 
with the homeless by IMPD satisfied the plaintiffs, and the ACLU dropped the lawsuit. Also as a 
result, IMPD assigned the sergeant in charge of Strategic Projects the task of addressing the 
homelessness issue.  
IMPD Homelessness and Panhandling Unit 
 
 The sergeant tasked with addressing the homelessness issue recognized quite quickly 
that he needed more manpower given the number of homeless individuals in Indianapolis.. After 
a period of time of operating with just two officers, the Homelessness and Panhandling Unit 
(HPU) was formally created in 2011 to address the immediate need in the community: to connect 
homeless individuals to shelter and services while keeping them out of the criminal justice 
system if at all possible. Within two years, the unit was fully staffed with one sergeant and four 
patrol officers all of whom are CIT trained.  
On any given day, HPU officers might respond to a complaint about a homeless 
individual or camp, accompany medical or social service outreach workers to camps, search for 
missing individuals, or simply check on a particularly vulnerable individual. Complaints handled 
by the unit may be formal, via the Mayor’s Action Center hotline, the HPU-specific email, or 
voicemail; more informal complaints may arrive through a personal phone call from another 
police officer or agency partner. The HPU also accepts detective cases that have a homelessness 
                                                 
4 IMPD General Order 1.21 Interactions with Homeless Persons effective November 19, 2009, revised November 
30, 2012. 
10 
 
 
 
component, that is, the victim, suspect, or a witness is homeless. And, the HPU works directly 
with the Department of Public Works when there is a planned ‘clean up’ of any area that might 
be considered a homeless camp.  
Using SARA to Address the Homeless  
 
IMPD has taken an innovative approach to addressing and the serving the homeless 
population in Marion County and addressing attendant concerns. As noted earlier, IMPD created 
the HPU because of increased complaints from citizens about homeless camps both on public 
and private property, homeless people loitering in public places, among other common nuisance-
like (but mostly non-criminal) issues. District officers were repeatedly responding to radio runs 
and interacting with homeless individuals who they believed suffered from mental illness, 
addiction, or some combination of both.  
Knowing that a purely legal response to homelessness would not be effective (Eck 2003; 
Sherman et al. 2002). the sergeant  approached the issue by applying a commonly used problem-
oriented policing methodology known as the SARA (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and 
Assessment) Model (Eck and Spelman 1987).5 Problem-oriented policing (POP) (Goldstein 
1979) would allow IMPD to address the non-legal issues associated with homelessness; the 
SARA model would guide a problem-based proactive response rather than an incident-based 
reactive response. This kind of response would be in contrast to the manner in which IMPD had 
been responding which was not legal in many instances, and, frankly, not working. Using four 
steps, the SARA model helps guide police to identify problems, determine their underlying 
causes, and implement and assess evidence-based responses (Eck 2003). While assessment is the 
                                                 
5 A long discussion on SARA is omitted intentionally as it is not the focus of the article. It is discussed in an attempt 
to accurately reflect the sequence of events. 
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fourth step, given that police officers are using this technique, it does not always entail formal, 
rigorous outcome evaluation.  
The scanning or problem-identification step revealed several points: 1) district officers 
were repeatedly responding to calls for service that involved interactions with homeless 
individuals; 2) responding officers believed that the majority of the homeless individuals 
suffered from mental illness and/or addiction; 3) officers were frustrated in that most interactions 
with homeless individuals did not lead to a satisfactory outcome; and 4) responding to homeless 
individual related calls was a drain on limited police resources. Despite the fact that an arrest 
would only address that specific incident and not the problem, it was the most likely outcome 
because officers did not perceive an alternative. 
After identifying the problem, the next step in the SARA process is analysis. The goal of 
this step is to create a better understanding of the problem: why it occurs, how it is currently 
addressed. The sergeant conducted internal research including talking to street officers and 
requesting data from various sources, more traditional external research using conventional 
sources, as well as talking with peers at other law enforcement agencies. The analysis revealed 
three things about the City of Indianapolis: 1) the City had organizations that conducted 
homeless outreach, but outreach workers had limited exposure to mental health training; 2) the 
City had sporadic mental health outreach to homeless individuals who were not residing in 
shelters; 3) there was no comprehensive or coordinated mechanism for dealing with the homeless 
suffering from mental illness and/or addiction. Now that they had a better understanding of the 
problem, the HPU took it upon themselves to work towards developing a better response.   
At the time, IMPD did not have much data about the homeless population which would 
help direct their response to the identified problem. A common but inaccurate perception was 
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that homeless individuals suffering from mental illness were dangerous; this assertion was 
mostly conjecture, however but supported by the common arrest-based response by IMPD 
officers. With input from various IMPD units, the HPU identified twenty homeless individuals 
who suffered from mental illness and/or addiction and who had frequent law enforcement 
contact. Such individuals are also known as ‘frequent fliers’ or ‘chronic consumers’ (Akins et al. 
2014; Ford 2005; Houston Police Department 2010). The intent of this exercise was to draft a 
composite picture of the homeless population generally, and specifically of those who were 
known to have a disproportionately high number of contacts (i.e., arrests) with law enforcement. 
There was no real attempt by the HPU to be systematic for the purposes of research and there 
was no attempt to create a control group list for comparison. It is not uncommon for law 
enforcement to create chronic offender lists (i.e., worst of the worst lists, frequent flyer lists, etc.) 
in this fashion in an attempt to direct limited resources for the most benefit (see, for example, 
Bynum et al. 2006; Houston Police Department 2010). Quick criminal history checks6 on the 20 
identified individuals confirmed they were indeed the focus of considerable criminal justice 
resources, however, just not in the way officers and the public thought. From the mid-1980s to 
2011, the 20 identified individuals accounted for 1070 combined arrests, the majority of which 
were alcohol use related. One individual accounted for 206 of the arrests (19%). See Appendix A 
for more details on the 1070 arrests. 
Creating the Community Outreach Taskforce (COT Force) 
 
The third step in the SARA model is response. Based on information and understanding 
of the problem developed during the first two steps, a response to the problem is developed and 
implemented. This step is where actions and effectiveness are tested; it is often the lengthiest 
                                                 
6 Criminal history data included information on arrests occurring in Marion County (Indianapolis) only. 
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step in the SARA problem solving model. In this case, the response would be grounded in 
partnerships between IMPD and other stakeholders in Indianapolis responding to the issue of 
homelessness. 
The analysis step created an opportunity for the sergeant to meet the mental health court 
judge to discuss the specific issues concerning the police department and its interactions with the 
homeless population. This initial meeting led to a larger meeting in August 2009, facilitated by 
the judge, of all stakeholders in Marion County related to the homeless and the mentally ill. Over 
60 people attended this meeting including stakeholders from across the criminal justice system 
and public safety as well as from homeless outreach organizations, service providers, and 
medical and mental health providers. This was the first time any such meeting had been held as 
well as the first time many of the attendees had been in the same room together despite their 
common target populations. The message was clear and supported the problem identification and 
analysis steps undertaken by the HPU: The City lacked a coordinated effort to address homeless 
individuals suffering from mental health and/or substance abuse issues. And, there was also the 
acknowledgement that the public safety response was ineffective. The police, prosecutor, and 
courts were seeing the same individuals (i.e., chronic consumers) over and over again, usually 
for the same alcohol-related offenses.  
In order to implement changes especially in police procedures, the sergeant created a 
working group consisting of stakeholders from the original large meeting. The working group 
was first known as the Homeless Mental Health Case Conferencing group, and is now known as 
Community Outreach Taskforce (COT Force). The group set a goal of addressing homeless 
individuals with mental illness and/or addictions issues that were chronic consumers of law 
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enforcement resources (the group did not include frequent EMS or emergency department use at 
first).  
The COT Force operates as a task force and does not have any full-time employees. To 
be nominated for COT Force intervention, an individual must be currently homeless or must be 
known as chronically homeless. The individual must also have a mental health diagnosis and/or a 
substance abuse issue, and finally, have frequent law enforcement or hospital emergency 
department contact. These individuals are the homeless ‘frequent fliers.’  
Any COT force member can nominate a homeless individual with mental health and/or 
addiction issues he or she feels meets the COT Force criteria mentioned above. Once a COT 
Force member makes a nomination, IMPD team members research the individual in police data 
systems looking for any contact he or she has had with law enforcement as either a perpetrator or 
a victim. The EMS team member also conducts research looking for EMS and emergency 
department contacts involving the nominee. After this groundwork is complete, IMPD and EMS 
members report back to the entire COT Force and the group decides whether or not to continue 
on with the nominee as a COT Force client.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
If the group agrees to add the nominee as a COT Force client, the next step is for the 
referring group member (or the member who has the best relationship with the nominee) to 
approach the nominee, explain the opportunity to become a COT Force client, and obtain a 
signed release of information (ROI) from him or her. The ROI was developed to facilitate the 
open discussion of COT Force participants. The ROI includes all the COT Force members, and 
by signing it, the participant waives some privacy rights that would otherwise prevent discussion 
and coordination of recommended services (e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
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Act, [HIPPA]). The signed ROI allows COT Force members to discuss physical health, mental 
health, and criminal records with each other.  Nominees can decline participation and leave the 
program at any time. 
With a signed ROI on file, COT Force will conduct the modified incident review (Klofas 
et al. 2006), examining mental health diagnoses and current treatment, arrests, case reports, 
pending court cases, probation status, and outreach connections. The group then develops a 
treatment plan for the client. This plan might include drug and/or alcohol detoxification, 
vocational rehabilitation, job training, applying for disability services, obtaining an identification 
card, obtaining and taking medications consistently, or life skills training. The next step is to 
encourage the client to engage in the treatment plan using a one or more of a variety of options. 
Sometimes, this treatment occurs voluntarily; COT Force describes it as being ready when the 
individual is ready. Sometimes, it occurs as the result of immediate detention, street plea 
bargains, court sentencing, or outreach relationships.  
The point of contact (POC) for the client is a COT Force member who also serves as the 
ad hoc case manager for the client. The POC works with the client to help him or her navigate 
appointments, transportation, and any other potential barriers that may arise as the client works 
his or her way through the treatment plan. From this point on, the client mainly has interaction 
with the POC. However, through the partnerships establish by COT Force, the entire group adds 
another layer of supervision, accountability, and support for the client beyond just the ad hoc 
case manager. And, the monthly meetings serve as a forum for updates on clients from all COT 
Force members as well as a time to make plan adjustments if needed. 
COT Force has established cross-system communication channels that help them monitor 
COT Force Clients, although there is no formal ‘flag’ on a COT Force Client that would appear 
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if, for example, a non-HPU police officer arrested a client. The notification systems in place are 
informal but cover arrests, emergency department visits, and EMS transports. Therefore, if a 
client is arrested, the jail will notify the HPU or perhaps an outreach agency who will work to get 
the client what he or she needs while in jail and then also try and get the client to commit to 
services such as detox or an appointment with a mental health professional upon release. COT 
Force clients remain clients as long as they are willing or until they complete their individualized 
goals. Arrest, relapse, etc. are not causes for expulsion from the program. An unintended 
diffusion of benefits from this cross-system communication is that the notification mentioned 
happens for similar homeless individuals who are not COT Force clients. 
The fourth step in the SARA process is assessment. This step involves at least a process 
evaluation and can include an outcome evaluation to determine if the project goals and objectives 
were met. In this case, COT Force members conducted a self-assessment.  
COT Force began accepting clients in the fall of 2009. It is worth noting again that client 
participation is voluntary. In the first year, the group nominated three individuals from the 
frequent flier list (part of the analysis step) to become COT Force’s inaugural clients. These three 
individuals had a combined total of 401 arrests (of the 1070) and 116 of those arrests occurred in 
the three years prior to the creation of COT Force (2006-2008). All three nominees agreed to 
become part of the COT Force program and signed ROIs.   
Client 1 is a male who was in his mid-50s at the time he became a COT Force client. He 
had been arrested over 200 times in his lifetime, the majority for alcohol-related offenses. 
Arresting this individual had not changed his behavior, treated his mental illness, or assisted him 
with housing. As part of his COT Force plan, he entered treatment in the fall of 2009 and has 
maintained housing and recovery since then. Client 2 is also a male in his mid-50s. He has been 
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arrested over 120 times in his lifetime, with all but a handful for alcohol-related offenses as well. 
He was in and out of treatment for about one year and has maintained housing and recovery 
since the fall of 2010. And, Client 3, a male in his early 40s, has been arrested over 75 times, 
again the majority for alcohol-related offenses but also for a considerable number of trespass 
offenses7. Client 3 was in and out of treatment for a little over one year, maintained housing and 
recovery for three years and relapsed in early 2014. These are simplified descriptions of each 
client; detailed information on service engagement is missing given the amount of time that has 
passed and the fact that there is no central records management system for the COT Force (i.e., 
each agency has its own records management system). 
Although there has been no formal process or outcome evaluation of COT Force to date, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that COT Force is meeting their goals of reducing criminal justice 
and public health system consumption by homeless, mentally ill ‘frequent fliers.’ One cannot 
deny that the first three clients created criminal justice system savings solely through reduced 
arrests. Since the original three clients, COT Force has served an estimated 92 clients. In addition 
to reduced arrests, clients are demonstrating increased engagement in mental health and/or 
substance abuse services, and spending more time in housing and less time on the streets.  
The Importance of Partnerships in Problem-Solving 
 
First, homelessness is everyone’s issue, not just the police department’s. Often 
unacknowledged by society, the police are frequently the first point of contact for many 
homeless individuals. But they should not be solely responsible for solutions; partnerships and 
collaboration are really the best way to address these criminal justice issues in the future 
(Council of State Governments 2002; Klofas et al. 2010; Lamb et al. 2002; Normore et al. 2015). 
                                                 
7 It is not uncommon for homeless individuals to incur a high number of trespassing arrests. These arrests are 
typically related to their use of private property (usually a business) for sleeping, panhandling, eating, etc. 
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IMPD had to find another way to approach homelessness in Indianapolis. What they had been 
doing was not working and had created legal action against the City. COT Force, it seems, was 
born out of necessity. Simply acknowledging that there is more than one way to work with the 
homeless and mentally ill was a huge step for all involved.  
Second, the collective mission of serving the homeless individual with mental health 
issues must be the priority (Normore et al. 2015). Therefore, the focus on partnerships and trust 
is critical to both inter-agency collaboration between COT Force members and serving the 
clients. The process of recovery takes time and patience. Each member of COT Force and the 
HPU recognizes that a homeless individual has to be ready to take the steps necessary to address 
the cause of his or her homelessness; it is the role of the police force and social services to 
establish trust, make contact early and often through outreach to homeless individuals and 
camps, regularly, and involve partnering agencies in each stage. COT Force would not function 
without partnerships and trust as priorities to reach the common goal. 
Third, partnerships allow for flexibility in responses. Individuals find themselves 
homeless for a wide range of reasons and conditions, therefore responses must be tailored to the 
individual by necessity. The context surrounding each homeless individual is unique and 
therefore there is no ‘one size fits all’ manner with which to get an individual into housing and/or 
treatment or even to agree to participate in COT Force. With no formal standard operating 
procedures or formal rules and regulations, all actions grow out of the ROI. This agreement 
allows the group to discuss clients and tailor a response that fits each client’s needs. And, COT 
Force members from each participating agency are deeply ingrained in their agencies and know 
their agencies’ resources and rules. This allows each member to get things done even if it 
sometimes requires flexing of the rules. It frequently takes considerable trial and error to find the 
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right formula for each person. Relationships are crucial and a lot of the hard work is relationship 
building- both at the individual level and the agency level. 
This pilot case study is not without limitations and any claims regarding success and 
future studies of COT Force should be informed by these limitations. A noted earlier, this 
project, like many police problem solving efforts lacks the necessary components for a rigorous 
formal evaluation (see, Weisburd et al. 2010). Due to the nature of the partnerships and the 
multi-agency collaboration, detailed data on services (dates, types, etc.) obtained by in clients 
were unavailable. A formal outcome evaluation would quantitatively measure the efficacy of 
what is happening in Indianapolis and strengthen the anecdotal evidence that indicates some 
success. Every effort should be made to find a suitable control group. Future studies should seek 
to determine if COT force keeps homeless individuals out of the criminal justice system when 
not necessary; survival rates could be measured along a host of variables such as maintaining 
housing, maintaining sobriety or mental health stability, and especially life expectancy. At the 
same time, current resources do not allow COT Force to enlist every homeless individual. 
Perhaps there is a diffusion of benefits to others experiencing homeless but who are not COT 
Force clients.  
Conclusion 
 
Society has come to rely on the criminal justice system to solve people’s problems 
(Johnson 2011) and too often crisis drives policy (see, for example, Slate et al. 2013). The 
deinstitutionalization movement reaffirmed this reliance by expanding the role of police officers 
as gatekeepers for the mentally ill to both the criminal justice and mental health systems (Lamb 
et al. 2002). The high incidence of mental illness in the homeless population only makes the 
issue more complex. CIT-like programs have changed the way trained police officers interact 
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with the mentally ill and their families at times of crises, for example, through active listening 
and de-escalation techniques. At the same time, not all police interactions with the mentally ill 
happen at times of trauma or emergency; multiagency response is necessary to respond to 
homelessness and make meaningful change (Slate et al. 2013).   
In Indianapolis, the police department is leading the effort to bring together the necessary 
agencies to respond to the homeless population before a crisis occurs. Grounded in partnerships, 
the COT Force and the HPU are working to solve problems at the individual level, one at a time, 
making every effort to keep homeless individuals out of the criminal justice system if they do not 
need to be there, encourage homeless individuals into whatever treatment is appropriate, and 
work to end homelessness one person at a time through repetitive individual contact and 
supportive services. Police should consider similar multi-agency ‘upstream’ approaches (Wood 
et al. 2011; Wood and Beierschmitt 2014) to address homeless individuals suffering from mental 
illness as well as for other public safety issues where chronic consummation of police and public 
safety resources could be reduced. These partnerships allow for a problem-solving approach  that 
reaches well beyond that solely of the police (Normore et al. 2015).  
However, twenty five years after he first conceptualized POP, Herman Goldstein 
criticized the POP movement saying that many police agencies are only implementing POP 
projects superficially (Goldstein 2003). Indeed, effective implementation of multi-agency 
initiatives is difficult and often such efforts fail or have unintended results (McGarrell and 
Hipple 2014). Additionally, the lack of rigorous evaluation is one of the signals that agencies are 
not fully investing in POP (Goldstein 2003). As mentioned at the outset, this project is no 
exception to Goldstein’s criticism due to the lack of formal evaluation.  
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Barriers to full implementation are not new to criminal justice projects. COT Force and 
the HPU have suffered from the same implementation pains other criminal justice initiatives 
have faced: limited financial resources, changing personnel, and lack of understanding at the 
agency level. Wood and Bradley (2009) suggest three essential conditions for a partnership 
policing effort like COT Force to work: capability, culture and accountability. They suggest 
these conditions at an agency level; however this case study would suggest it is possible for the 
police to meet the conditions and have a positive effect at a smaller level (i.e. unit) given upper 
management support (Wood and Bradley 2009). The police-led model based on partnerships 
presented here, while still formally untested, shows promise for jurisdictions working homeless, 
mentally ill populations collaboratively at the front line (Carpenter et al. 2016) . Finally, 
including a researcher in the problem-solving process can serve to further promote collaborative 
solutions to cross-system issues (Johnson 2011) through research and evaluation (Knutsson 
2009). More practical research on police collaboration is necessary to create a ‘best practice’ 
empirical foundation upon which other police agencies may draw (Carpenter et al. 2016; 
Goldstein 2003).   
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Figure 1 
The COT Force Process 
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Appendix A 
Arrest Categories and Included Offenses for ‘Top 20’ 
Charge Category Included Charges Count % 
Alcohol related  Operating a vehicle while intoxicated (all charges) 
Public intoxication  
739 69.1 
Driving related  Driving never receiving a license 
Driving while license suspended  
Obstruction of traffic 
8 0.75 
Drug related   Dealing or possession of scheduled drug, controlled 
substance, cocaine, marijuana, paraphernalia  
34
  
3.18 
Fraud related  Forgery 1 0.10 
Obstruction of justice  Bribery 
False reporting or informing 
Resisting law enforcement 
36 3.36 
Other  6 0.56 
Personal related  Disorderly conduct  
Intimidation  
Invasion of privacy 
Panhandling 
45 4.21 
Property crime related  Auto theft/Receiving stolen parts 
Burglary/Residential entry 
Criminal conversion 
Criminal mischief 
Trespass 
Theft/Receiving stolen property 
131 12.24 
Sex crime related  Prostitution 
Public Indecency/Indecent exposure 
17 1.59 
Violent crime related  Battery 
Criminal recklessness 
Murder 
Robbery 
Strangulation 
52 4.86 
Weapon related Possession of a machine gun or loaded bomb 1 .10 
Total  1070 100.0 
 
